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Abstract—The popularity of Internet-of-Things (IoT) comes with security concerns. Attacks against wireless communication venues of
IoT (e.g., Man-in-the-Middle attacks) have grown at an alarming rate over the past decade. Pairing, which allows the establishment of
the secure communicating channels for IoT devices without a prior relationship, is thus a paramount capability. Existing secure pairing
protocols require auxiliary equipment/peripheral (e.g., displays, speakers and sensors) to achieve authentication, which is
unacceptable for low-priced devices such as smart lamps. This paper studies how to design a peripheral-free secure pairing protocol.
Concretely, we design the protocol, termed SwitchPairing, via out-of-box power supplying chargers and on-board clocks, achieving
security and economics at the same time. When a user wants to pair two or more devices, he/she connects the pairing devices to the
same power source, and presses/releases the switch on/off button several times. Then, the press and release timing can be used to
derive symmetric keys. We implement a prototype via two CC2640R2F development boards from Texas Instruments (TI) due to its
prevalence. Extensive experiments and user studies are also conducted to benchmark our protocol in terms of efficiency and security.
Index Terms—IoT Security, Pairing protocols, Proximity-based device pairing, Bluetooth Low Energy, Passkey Entry
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is a novel paradigm that has
received a lot of recent attention. It features a broad spec-
trum of applications, ranging from smart home appliances
to smart city and vehicle to vehicle networks. In the context
of IoT, all things will be interconnected, and a user may
control the things around via a smart controller such as a
smartphone. IoT arguably will change the way we conduct
our everyday affairs. Recent reports and statistics indicate
that such an IoT era is approaching: according to a report
from statistics [1], more than 30 billion devices/things will
be connected to the internet by the end of 2020. This number
will hit 75 billion by 2025.
However, there are various attacks that may threat the
security of IoT, such as Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks
[2] and spoofing attacks [3]. Countermeasures have been
proposed to hinder these attacks, and using pairing proto-
cols is one of these countermeasures. An IoT system usually
involves a cloud server, some IoT devices, and a remote
controller such as a smartphone with specific apps. The
communications between the cloud server and the remote
controller/IoT devices may be secured by public-key cryp-
tographic protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[4], while pairing is designed to build upon a secure channel
for the IoT devices and the remote controller. One example
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of pairing protocol is Bluetooth Simple Secure Protocol (SSP)
[5], which enables two devices equipped with Bluetooth
modules such as a remote controller and an IoT device in
close proximity to communicate securely.
Pairing protocols that require the pairing devices in close
proximity such as Bluetooth SSP are referred to proximity-
based device pairing protocol [6]. In these schemes, the
owner is close to his pairing devices (i.e., the remote con-
troller and the IoT devices) and may need to perform
specific operations, while the attackers are further away that
do not have physical access of them. To achieve the pairing
protocols, trusted auxiliary channels such as audio-visual
signal [7], [8], correlated human behavior [9], [10] will be
involved to exchange secrets, which latter will be used to
derive a security key on each pairing device. For example,
in Passkey-entry pairing strategy of Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) [10], one device (either the remote controller or the
IoT device) displays a 6 digits pin (i.e. secrets), while the
pairing operator sees the pin, and enters the pin to another
device. In the Numeric Comparison pairing strategy of BLE,
the owner has to check if pins displayed on the two pairing
devices are the same and makes confirmation by pressing
the ”YES” buttons on both devices.
These proximity-based device pairing protocols are not
omnipotent since it only gives a trade-off between security
and economics. That is, manufacturers have to pay extra
costs to guarantee the security of their products. For ex-
ample, Passkey-entry or Numeric Comparison of BLE requires
one device or the two devices to equip displays or keypads,
while other protocols may require both of the two devices
integrate out of band communication modules, such as NFC
modules, speakers or cameras [7], [8], [11], [12]. Instead of
spending extra cost to apply secure pairing strategies, the
manufacturers may rather choose insecure pairing protocols
such as Just Works of Bluetooth. For example, it is unac-
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ceptable for some low-priced devices, such as smart lamp
to equip a display or keyboard only for pairing purpose.
The fact that using the insecure protocols rather than the
secure pairing protocols has grave impacts given IoT broad
application domains, in which the products are plagued by
MITM attacks.
This paper studies how to design a secure IoT pairing
protocol that requires no extra cost for pairing devices,
allowing devices to achieve security and economics simulta-
neously. The term “without extra cost” in our context refers
to a scenario where the pairing devices set up a trusted
channel without auxiliary equipment such as displays or
keypads. Our insight is that the owners of two devices
need to assist the two pairing devices to exchange secrets
securely. Therefore, auxiliary equipment is involved, such as
a display or a keypad. Instead of using auxiliary equipment,
if these devices can establish alternative trusted channels by
using their out-of-box components, like the power supply
chargers, the extra cost can be avoided.
Motivated by our observations, we carefully investigate
the procedure of secure pairing protocol and propose a
new pairing protocol, termed SwitchPairing. We achieve
secure pairing via the power supply charger and on-board
clock of the devices since almost every IoT device has these
components. Our pairing protocol works as follows:
1) The user connects the pairing devices to the same
power source, i.e., a plug;
2) Two paring devices communicate with each other
via the communicating channel such as Bluetooth
channel and synchronize the frequency of their on-
board clocks;
3) The user switches the power source on and off inten-
tionally several times. The timing of switch on/off
are recorded by each pairing devices, respectively;
4) The timing of the switch on/off are regarded as
the initial values that can be used to derive the
cryptographic keys and secure the communicating
channel.
The benefits of adopting our protocol are threefold: (i)
The usage of the power supply charger and on-board clock
will keep our design economically viable and suitable for all
kinds of devices, even the ones as simple as smart lamps.
(ii) Our protocol is capable of thwarting attacks such as
MITM attack and more secure when compared with other
pairing protocols. In our pairing protocol, the attacker will
fail to obtain the timing of power switch off/on, even
if the attacker can peep the user’s operations somehow.
Contrastingly, the classic pairing protocol such as Bluetooth
pairing protocols will become completely defenseless when
such an assumption is made. Moreover, unlike the most of
context-aware pairing protocol which will fail to maintain
their security when an attacker is nearby, our protocol can
defend the attackers without physical access to the device
and the threat model is much more realistic. Finally, in
terms of defending guessing attack, the exchanged secrets
can be very strong, depending on the precision of the on-
board clock and the times that the user switches on/off
the plug (See Section 6). (iii) Our SwitchPairing can
also be performed on multiple devices rather than just two
devices, seeing that multiple devices can be connected to the
same power source. In this case, all devices can follow the
same procedure of our protocol without any modification,
obtaining the same cryptographic key.
Contributions: We summarize the main contributions of
this paper as follows:
• We design a new pairing protocol, SwitchPairing,
in which the pairing devices can negotiate the same
security key without any extra equipment. Our de-
sign provides a good guideline for the community to
follow in terms of designing economically viable and
secure pairing protocols.
• We implement a prototype via two CC2640R2F de-
veloping boards from Texas Instruments (TI) due to
the prevalence of their products and the support of
the IoT programming framework. Implementation
criteria is given, so that the community can benefit
from our design in a timely manner.
• Extensive evaluations and security analysis have
been performed to benchmark our protocol. We
conclude that our new protocol can also achieve
high security with low overloads. In addition, for
those devices with abundant I/O capabilities, such
as speakers, cameras, and displays, can also adopt
our protocol to achieve their security requirements.
Roadmap: The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Related works are presented in Section 2. Section 3 provides
the necessary background information of Pairing. In Section
4, we illustrate our threat model and the design of our
pairing protocol. The implementation criteria is elaborated
in Section 5. Section 6 presents the security analysis of our
Switchpairing protocol. Evaluations and user studies are
presented in Section 7. Section 8 discusses a few interesting
topics. This paper is concluded in Section 9.
2 RELATED WORK
In this Section, we first review secure pairing protocols,
which evidences the added value that our paper brings
to state of the art. We also discuss the attacks on pairing
protocols. It is noteworthy that our protocol can also defense
these attacks.
2.1 Secure pairing protocols
We first review the secure pairing protocols. Secure pair-
ing can establish an association (e.g., generating the same
key) for two or more devices without a prior relationship.
All solutions below require trusted certification authorities,
physical connection [13] (which may subject to specification
of interface ) or auxiliary channels such as speakers [14],
displays [15] and cameras [16].
Trusted certification authorities: In early times, secure
pairing protocols are achieved by using the public-key
based key exchange protocols such as authenticated Diffie-
Hellman protocols [17]. In these schemes [18], [19], the pair-
ing devices must pre-share the same root CA as a trusted
root. However, it is unrealistic for heterogeneous IoT devices
to have the same root CA.
Visual/Audio-based pairing protocols: In the scheme
proposed by Mccune et al. [15], a device is required to
display a barcode and users have to take a snapshot then
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share to the peer somehow. Their scheme requires devices
to have cameras and displays. Saxena et al. [8] improved
this scheme. They demonstrated that mutual authentication
can be achieved with an unidirectional visual channel. In
their paper, one device encodes the secrets as light signals
by turning the light source on and off repeatedly, while the
other device uses its camera to receive these signals and
decode the secrets. Their solution still requires one device
to equip a camera, which is clearly a burden for devices
like smart lamps. Additionally, there are various options for
two pairing devices equipping displays to achieve secure
pairing, such as hash value, strings, colorful flag [16], and
random figures [20], which requires users to hold on the
two pairing devices and compare the characters or figures
displayed. Particularly, Bluetooth pairing protocols (Passkey
Entry and Numeric Comparison) are belongs to visual based
pairing protocols. There are also pairing protocols estab-
lished on audio channels, such as HAPADEP [14] proposed
by Soriente et al. and work by Prasad [7]. In these protocols,
auxiliary equipment such as speakers is required on the
pairing devices.
Sensor-based pairing protocols: With the development
of IoT technologies, more advanced auxiliary channels have
be involved in the pairing process, such as Near Field
Communication (NFC) [10], Laser [21], Infrared [22], [23],
accelerometers [24]. Holmquist et al. [25] proposed a pair-
ing protocol that allows devices with vibration sensors to
achieve the pairing securely. In their scheme, a user is
required to take the two pairing devices in one hand and
shakes them, so that the similar movement data will be
sensed by the vibration sensors. Similar movement data can
then be used to generate the same key. A similar solution
was discussed in efforts by Mayrhofer [26]. Nevertheless,
low priced devices, such as lamps usually do not have vibra-
tion sensors. More recently, secure pairing is made possible
due to the popularity of various on-board sensors, such
as magnetometers [27], motion detectors [28] and footstep
monitors [29]. Sometimes, a pairing protocol may involve
multiple sensors, such as the work by Han [30]. Using sen-
sors to achieve secure pairing without human involvement
is referred to context-based pairing in pairing terminology.
Chaotic signals [31], ambient noise and luminosity [11], [12]
can be used as secrets to generate symmetric keys. It can be
concluded that all these pairing protocols require auxiliary
equipment.
2.2 Attacks against pairing protocols
In this Section, we will review the efforts related to the
attacks on pairing protocols. Rudimentary pairing protocols
are subject to various attacks, such as eavesdropping attack
or PIN cracking [32], [33], [34]. In 2008, Haataja et al. [35],
[36] propose MITM attacks against SSP of Bluetooth Classic.
Their insights are a malicious device can manipulate their
I/O capabilities, and pair with a victim device using Just
Works method. Early in 2012, Gomez et al. [37] present
that BLE suffers from some security issues, such as replay
attacks. Mike Ryan et al. [38] show that for LE Legacy which
is the early version of BLE, the Passkey Entry is vulnerable
to guessing attacks. To explore the vulnerabilities of LE
Legacy pairing, he also releases a tool named crackle. Based
on this principle, Rosa et al. [39] and Zegeye et al. [40] design
their own attack vectors that break the LE Legacy pairing
effectively. Da-zhi et al. [41] demonstrate that reusing a
Passkey in Passkey Entry may cause grave consequences.
More recently, Zhang et al. [42] propose downgrade attacks.
Their insights are that the BLE specification does not enforce
secure pairing for master devices such as a smartphone,
leading insecure, one-way authentication. It can be observed
that most of the attacks are possible due to the use of the
insecure pairing protocol, such as Just Works [10], seeing
that these insecure pairing protocols do not involve a trust-
worthy third-party or channel to hinder “the man in the
middle”. Our novel pairing protocol use the power supply
charger and on-board clock to establish a trust channel,
countering attacks innately.
3 IOT SYSTEM AND PAIRING PROTOCOLS
In this Section, we will introduce the architecture of an
IoT system, and then we discuss pairing protocols briefly.
Particularly, we will provide more details of the pairing
process of Bluetooth Low Energy, which is closely related
to our work.
3.1 Architecture of an IoT system
As demonstrated in Fig. 1, an IoT system usually involves
a cloud server, some IoT devices and a remote controller
such as a smartphone with specific apps. The IoT devices
may implement various functions, such as medical mon-
itoring or illumination. The remote controller is used to
control and observe the status of the IoT devices. Basically,
the remote controller and an IoT device may communicate
with each other directly through the same communication
venue such as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. However, when they are
not in the same local network, the cloud server will relay
the traffic between the device and controller. For a lighting
system, the smart lamp is an IoT device, which provides
the lighting service for users. The user may use his remote
controller (e.g. his smartphone) to control the smart lamp
through Bluetooth. Initially, a user may want to bind his
controller with the IoT device via various communication
venues, which is referred to pairing. Security is crucial factor
for pairing process, considering that attackers may deploy
eavesdropping or MITM attacks, which pokes vulnerabili-
ties of IoT devices and compromises the entire IoT system.
3.2 Pairing protocols
The pairing process is designed for devices that have
security concerns. Basically, when pairing is enabled on
two entities such as a remote controller and an IoT device,
the same cryptographic key will be negotiated by both
devices, such that the two devices can encrypt the com-
munication using the negotiated key. To this end, devices
may share the same static secret such as a pass-code or a
key beforehand. However, these protocols are susceptible
to reverse engineering. Attackers may extract these static
secrets and deploy attacks directly. Proximity-based device
pairing schemes [6] are gaining popularity due to the fact
that these protocols do not require a static secrets to be
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Fig. 1: Architecture of an IoT system
pre-shared, on condition that they can counter the reverse
engineering innately.
As the term implies, proximity-based device pairing
schemes require the two pairing devices and their genuine
users are close to each other and the users are cable of
operating the pairing devices freely, while it also assumes
that the attacker is further away and does not have physical
access to the pairing devices. Instead of sharing the secrets
beforehand, the proximity-based device pairing schemes
require the two devices exchange secrets in real time. To this
end, trusted auxiliary channels such as audio-visual signal
[7], [8], correlated human behavior [9], [10] may be involved.
For the sake of easy presentation, we will elaborate on the
pairing process of Bluetooth Low Energy and explain the
details whenever needed. The pairing process of Bluetooth
Low Energy consists of three phases: (i) the two devices
exchange their pairing features. The pairing features here
mainly refer to the input and output capabilities such as
displays and keyboards. While other features, such as secure
connections bits are also exchanged in this phase, we will
not discuss since these features are out of our scope. (ii)
Based on the exchanged features, the two devices then pre-
form the authentication process and generate cryptographic
keys. There are four authentication methods available for
BLE, including “Passkey Entry”, “Numeric Comparison”,
“Out of Band (OOB)” and “Just Works”. Among them,
“Out of Band (OOB)”,“Passkey Entry” and “Numeric Com-
parison” are considered as secure pairing protocols, while
“Just Works” is subject to Man-in-the-Middle attack. Secure
pairing protocols are secure since these protocols involve
auxiliary channels to exchange secrets. (iii) After authenti-
cation, the two devices result in the same long term key.
This key is used to derive session keys, which are used to
encrypt links. When link is encrypted, other keys, such as an
IRK (i.e., identity resolution key, which is used to preserve
the privacy of Bluetooth devices) [10] can be delivered from
one device to the other. We will not discuss other keys due
to the page limitation.
4 SWITCHPAIRING
In this Section, we first discuss the threat model. We
present the high-level idea of our pairing protocol and
explain the procedure afterward.
4.1 Threat model
In our scenario, a user has one or more IoT devices, and
he can control these devices via a remote controller. The
ultimate goal of our protocol is to secure the communication
of the pairing process. Particularly, we make the following
assumptions:
1) We assume the attacker does not have physical
access to user’s devices, including the IoT device,
the remote controller and the power source which is
used in our protocol. This is reasonable since these
devices are sensitive gadgets, and people normally
tend them carefully.
2) We assume that the pairing devices have power
supply chargers and each of them has an onboard
clock. Note that most of devices have power supply
changers. Alternatively, if they do not have any
(e.g., battery-based), vendors can enable the related
interface to support one with negligible costs. For
the onboard clocks, most of the devices/chips have
electronic clocks [43].
3) In some sophisticated attacks, the attacker may peep
the operation of users, one difference to many other
secure pairing protocols such as Passkey Entry of
BLE is that, we do not make such an assumption.
That is, previous protocols can not defend such a
sophisticated attack.
4) We assume that the attacker can obtain the same
type of device and the official app as the user does.
This is reasonable since the apps are free to down-
load, while an attacker can purchase the same type
of device on the market with little effort. We made
this assumption because the security of our protocol
does not rely on the disclosure of the algorithm
involved in our protocol. Attackers are free to know
the workflow of our protocol.
5) We assume that the cryptographic algorithms are
not the source of the vulnerabilities. For example, at-
tackers cannot break the algorithm such as SHA256
hash algorithm used in the protocol.
4.2 Overview
From Section 3, we know that the security of pairing
depends on how the two devices exchange their messages
for secret agreement. That is, if the secret is transferred from
one device to another securely, the pairing protocol is secure.
For example, in Passkey Entry of BLE, correlated human
behavior is such a trusted channel. The owner of the two
devices works as a relay, and he sees the six digits from
one device and types it into another device. Without loss of
generality, we, therefore, define two channels in our paper:
(i) Communication channel refers to the channel through
which the data other than secrets will be transferred. (ii)
Auxiliary channel refers to the trusted channel through
which the secrets will be transferred.
Overall Solution: Originally, for the devices that do not
have any input/output capabilities, there is no other way
except a communication channel for them to exchange pa-
rameters. Therefore, we may need to set up an auxiliary
communication channel. Also, to keep our design economi-
cally viable, we must use these out-of-box components.
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Fig. 2: The workflow of SwitchPairing
We use a power supply changer to set up the channel.
Particularly, without connecting the two devices together
via a power supply charger, which may subject to inter-
face specification, we build an alternative communication
channel via a power source (e.g. a plug). Our idea is the
following: (i) We connect two devices to the same power
source, by using their own power supply charger. (ii) Most
devices/chips have electronic clocks [43]. We let both de-
vices synchronize clock frequencies via the communication
channel. (iii) The owner of the two devices can then switch
the power source on and off intentionally for a few times.
If each device records the timestamps of the power switch
off/on, the recorded timestamps contain enough amount
of information, which can be used to derive the same en-
cryption key. Also, the auxiliary channel used in our paper
is secure enough to defend attacks such as eavesdropping
attack and guessing attacks. In regards to this, we have a
complete security analysis that proposed in Section 6.
4.3 Pairing procedure
This Section will describe the pairing procedure of our
design. For the sake of easy presentation, we denote the
pairing initiator as I , and denote the pairing responder
as R. We assume that each of the pairing devices has a
public/private key pairs. We also assume that all the pairing
devices do not have any auxiliary equipment. As illustrated
in figure 2, we elaborate on our pairing protocol below and
notations to be used can be found in Table 1 for the easy
presentation:
1) Setup: Initially, the owner of the two devices plugs
the two devices into the same power source.
2) Pairing Feature Exchange: When the pairing pro-
cess starts, I and R exchange their pairing fea-
tures. At this moment, they are ready to initiate our
SwitchPairing authentication.
TABLE 1: Summary of notations
Notation Description
PKi the public key of a pairing device i
SKi the private key of a pairing device i
F (.) a hash function
H(.) a hash function other than F (.)
DH(.) the Elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman (ECDH) key
exchange algorithm
P (.) a hash function
3) Authentication - Public Key Exchange: The two
devices exchange public keys. We denote the ex-
changed public key as PKI and PKR, where PKI
refers to the public key of the initiator, while PKR
refers to the public key of the responder.
4) Authentication - Association: This process is the
core logic of our design. We list the steps below:
a) The two devices synchronize their clocks.
Once synchronized, each clock starts timing
simultaneously. We denote the initial times-
tamp as T0. Please note that the initial time
usually will not be a part of the secret.
b) The user switches off the power source, so
the power supply of both devices goes off.
Both devices lose their power at the same
moment t1, which will be recorded individ-
ually. The user turns the plug on afterward.
The user repeats this step for n − 1 times
(n > 4), depending on the security require-
ments of the application scenario, which will
result in n timestamps. At this time, each
device has:
S(T ) = {t1, t2, t3...tn} (1)
It is worthy-noting that there is a delay be-
tween the time when a user switch-off/on
the power source and the time when devices
really are turned off/on. Such a delay is
unavoidable due to the working principle of
AC-DC converter [44]. However, due to the
diversity of integration and implementation,
the delay may also vary from one device
to another, causing the timing obtained on
each device is different, which shall not be
ignored. Regarding this, we proposed our
processing strategy to counter the delays.
Please refer to Section 4.4 for more details.
c) Each device generates a random number rI
and rR respectively. Then they exchange the
random number.
d) Each device feeds the random number and
their public key together with S(T ) into a
function F (.) to compute a commitment. The
initiator will have CI :
CI = F (PKR, PKI , rI , S(T )) (2)
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and the responder will have CR:
CR = F (PKR, PKI , rR, S(T )) (3)
Each device exchanges the commitments.
Then each device verifies if random num-
bers, public keys and secrets can result in
desired commitments. If yes, the same key
can be generated from these parameters:
DHKey = DH(SKA, PKB)
= DH(SKB , PKA)
(4)
where SKA and SKB are the corresponding
private keys of PKA and PKB respectively.
Key = P{DHKey, S(T ), rR, rI} (5)
Please note that the demonstration is pre-
sented in the case of two pairing device,
while our protocol can be also adopted on
multiple device with little efforts. In the case
of multiple devices, all devices shall be con-
nected to the same power source and ex-
change public keys to each other (In the end
of our pairing protocol, every two devices
shall generate a key that used to commu-
nicate with each other), while the rest pro-
cedures are similar and we will not go to
details due to the page limit.
4.4 Delay processing
Recall that there is a delay between the time when a user
switch-off/on the power source and the time when devices
really are turned off/on. This delay may vary from one
device to another due to the manufacture. We introduce
delay tolerance and fault tolerance to address this problem.
Delay Tolerance: We define the delay tolerance to handle
this issue. With the delay tolerance defined, when a user
preforms the switch-off operations, if the difference between
two delays is less than delay tolerance, the two pairing de-
vices can be considered as losing the power at the same time.
Similar principles are also adopted when a user switches on
the devices. For example, we assume the delay tolerance is
τ . When user performs the switch-off operation, the time
point of losing power for the initiator is tI , while that for
the responder is tR. If the equation 6 is satisfied, the two
devices can be considered as losing power at the same time.
|tI − tR| < τ (6)
However, obtaining the difference between tI and tR is
tricky since the timestamps can not be transferred through
the communicating channel. Our idea is that we let τ equal
the common time precision of the pairing devices (i.e., the
minimal measurement of time for the pairing devices). In
such a way, we can change τ by modifying the the time
precision of the pairing devices without transferring the
time points. The common time precision of two pairing
devices is defined as follows:
τ = tpcom = MAX{tpI , tpR} (7)
where tpI and tpR are the time precision of the pairing
devices, respectively. For multiple devices, a common delay
tolerance shall be negotiated in a similar way. We assume
that m devices are connected to the same power source and
when a user presses the switch off/on button of the power
source, each device obtains the timing of losing power for
itself, which can be represented as follows:
Tn = {t1, t2, t3...tm} (8)
Therefore, we define the common delay tolerance for
multiple devices as follows:
τcom = MAX{|ti − tj |} = MAX{tpi, tpj} (9)
where:
i 6= j; 0 < i, j ≤ m;m > 2; (10)
In Section 7, we explore the delay tolerance for two
CC2640R2F chips to show the correctness of our principles.
Fault tolerance: Another factor that may mitigate the
delay issue is the fault tolerance. The fault tolerance in our
context is the capability that allows the pairing procedure to
continue computing the key properly in the scenario where
the timestamps obtained by each pairing device are not ex-
actly identical. Besides, for the same operation performed by
the user (i.e., a switch off/on operation), if the timestamps
obtained by each device are different, this event is referred
to an error. The number of errors over the number of switch
off/on operations is denoted as the error rate. Basically, a
lager fault tolerance will allow more errors. We introduce
our algorithm to enable the devices compute the error rate
before the key generation without exchanging timestamps.
To this end, both device may want to exchange data other
than the timestamps via the communicating channel and
the data exchanged is termed evidence in our protocol. We
first use the scenario where there are two pairing devices,
denoted as deviceA and deviceB, who want to pair up, and
discuss the difference of that on multiple device afterwards.
We assume that the user turns off/on the power source n
times (n > 4), which will result in n timestamps on each
device. At this time, device A has:
S(T )A = {tA1 , tA2 , tA3 ...tAn } (11)
while device B has:
S(T )B = {tB1 , tB2 , tB3 ...tBn } (12)
device A and device B then use the same hash function,
denoted as H(.), to generate a vector, named evidence,
respectively, which can be represented below:
H(S(T )A) = {H(tA1 ), H(tA2 ), H(tA3 )...H(tAn )} (13)
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H(S(T )B) = {H(tB1 ), H(tB2 ), H(tB3 )...H(tBn )} (14)
Afterwards, the two pairing device exchange their evi-
dences and each device can compute the error rate ε respec-
tively:
ε =
∑n
i=1H(t
B
i )⊕H(tAi )
n
(15)
where:
4 < i < n (16)
In such a way, if tAi 6= tBi , then H(tAi ) ⊕ H(tBi ) = 1 due
to the property of hash functions. Therefore, each device
can know if there is any errors during the pairing process
without exchanging the timestamps. Meanwhile, if and only
if the error rate is less than fault tolerance, the two devices
can continue the pairing process. Otherwise, the two pairing
devices will tear down the connection and abort the pairing
process. For multiple devices (e.g. S(D) = D1, D2, ...Dm),
each device will obtain a matrix after a user turns off/on
the power source n times (n > 4), which can be represent as
follows: 
H(tD11 ) H(t
D1
2 ) .... H(t
D1
n )
H(tD21 ) H(t
D2
2 ) .... H(t
D2
n )
H(tD31 ) H(t
D3
2 ) .... H(t
D3
n )
... ... ... ...
H(tDm1 ) H(t
Dm
2 ) .... H(t
Dm
n )

Due to the property of hash function, if and only if the
rank of this matrix equals 1, the pairing process contains
no errors. Otherwise, the error rate ε can be represented as
follows:
ε =
∑m
i=1H(t
D1
i )⊕H(tD2i )⊕ ...H(tDn−1i )⊕H(tDni )
m
(17)
where:
4 < i < m (18)
It is worthy-noting that there is a trade-off between the
fault tolerance and security, developers may want to specify
the fault tolerance carefully according to the context. For
mission critical applications, a low fault tolerance should be
enforced to hinder potential attacks.
5 IMPLEMENTATION CRITERIA
We implement the proof-of-concept on two CC2640R2F
development boards from Texas Instruments (TI) to show
the feasibility of our SwitchPairing. Fig. 3 illustrates the
prototype. In Fig. 3a, a user operates the plug to perform
the association stage. In Fig. 3b, the two devices generate the
same secret. Please note that our solution suits all kinds of
devices, even those without any input/output components.
For the convenience of the demonstration, we install LCD
display modules on both development boards. For example,
by comparing the timestamp sequences, we can determine
whether both devices have shared the same secret.
The SDK platform from TI creates a variety of developing
solutions for developers to build their own products. In re-
gards of security, TI CC2640R2F has an AES accelerator and
an ECC library in ROM. Therefore, we may use the off-the-
shelf cryptographic APIs, without having to reimplement
the algorithms. In particular, our protocol is built on the
top of a typical BLE peripheral solution named “Simple
Peripheral”, since this solution integrates BLE stack and a
simple BLE application that handles the basic communica-
tion process.
To implement the protocol, we have a few major concerns.
First, our protocol involves the clock synchronization and
beating mechanism, and these should be carefully crafted.
Second, keys should remain in the flash of the chip when the
power goes off so that the pairing process will not repeat. To
address the above issues, we have the following solutions.
Clock mechanism: In TI’s SDK, clock instances are used
to define delayed or periodic tasks. The TI’s Real-Time
Operating System (TI-RTOS), which is a light-weight, multi-
thread operating system, will schedule such tasks according
to a given number of systems ticks. We use clock instances
to design a heartbeat mechanism. Specifically, a device will
start the synchronization with its peer device when it is in
the pairing stage. Meanwhile, a clock instance is initialized
and starts to perform a periodic heartbeat task every once
in a cycle period of T . We denote this T as temporal
precision for the easy of presentation. Particularly, according
to our experiment, the optimal temporal precision for the TI
CC2640 is 50 ms. That is, in every second, the TI CC2640
may generate 1000/50=20 different values that can be used
to derive the key. In such a way, we can track the moment
when users switch on/off the devices and generate a secret
that is secure enough.
Secret Key storage: The Simple NV (SNV) is an area in
the flash memory, which is dedicated for persistent data.
According to the document, the data stored in this area
will not lost when power is off; it can be used to store
sensitive data such as encryption keys. Therefore, we store
the heartbeat data in this flash memory area with provided
APIs osal snv read and osal snv write. Moreover, to protect
hardware-based cracking, we disable the debugging ports
after we finish the implementation.
The implementation criteria offer the community good
guidelines to follow. Note that our criteria can also be ex-
tended to other chips and other communicating venues with
little efforts. We use the TI CC2640 as a demonstration due
to its prevalence. Particularly, periodic tasks and persistent
memory are two fundamental features to craft our protocol.
Therefore, vendors can always implement our protocol on
other chips with such features enabled.
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS
The pairing procedure of our design follows the pro-
cedure of standard pairing protocol (e.g, Passkey Entry)
strictly so that our design will not downgrade the security
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(a) A user performs the association stage
(b) The two secrets displayed are the same
Fig. 3: The prototype of our SwitchPairing
of secure pairing protocols. Particularly, our SwitchPairing
defends the passive/active eavesdropping attacks, as well
as guessing attack without any changes.
6.1 Passive eavesdropping attack
To deploy the passive eavesdropping attack in our context
refers to the attacker can obtain the actual timestamps that
the user presses the button of power source passively, by
using some kind of devices such as a sniffer. After obtaining
timestamps, the attacker then uses the timestamp to com-
pute the secrets. However, the secret is transferred through
our “auxiliary channel”. As discussed in our threat model,
it is impossible for a regular attacker to deploy such an
attack because they do not have physical access to user’s
personal devices such as an IoT device or a power source, on
condition that the attacker has no chance to bug the power
source.
6.2 Active eavesdropping attack
Deploying active eavesdropping attack in our context
refers to such a scenario where a strong attacker can super-
vise the user somehow, such as an attacker stands around
the user and peeks the user’s operations. Many legacy
pairing protocols, such as PIN based pairing protocols or
Visual/Audio-based pairing protocols, can not defend such
a type of attack. For example, the PIN based pairing protocol
will fail if the attacker can peek the six digits PIN. In such a
case, the attacker may block the victim devices and deploy
the MITM attack with no change.
Our protocol can defend this type of attack. This is be-
cause the reaction speed of a human subject is relatively
slow when compared to machines. Even if the attacker
observes that a user presses the button, it still takes a while
for him to handle the information and record the actual time.
Regarding this, we have a complete evaluation in Section
7.6.
6.3 Guessing attack
In guessing attack, instead of passively or actively eaves-
dropping the secrets, the attacker may want to obtain the
correct secret by guessing. The success rate of defending
the guessing attack depends on the amount of information
contained in the transferred secret. Therefore, the exchanged
parameter should be strong enough to hinder the guess-
ing attacks. For example, in Passkey Entry protocol, the
exchanged secret is set to a 6-digits number, ranging from
“000000” to “999999”. There are 1000000 possibilities. Given
that the attacker only has one chance to make the secret
right, the success rate for an attacker deploys such an attack
is 0.000001.
Our pairing protocol can also defend the guessing at-
tack effectively. Particularly, we assume the common delay
tolerance is tcom ms, so that it can generate 1000/tcom
different values in a second. We assume that during the
pairing process, the user performs n time of switch off/on
operations. However, there is a time period between each
timestamp due to the reaction time of the user. We assume
the reaction time of a user is Tr seconds. Therefore, we have
the following equation, where P is the probability that an
attacker deploys the guessing attack successfully:
P =
1
(1000× Tr/tcom)n (19)
For the CC2640 chips used in our experiments (please
refer to Section 5 and Section 7 for more details), we have
already known that the delay tolerance is 120. We let Tr = 8
and n = 4, which refers to a user may complete the
association process by performing the switch on/off 4 times,
and the reaction time for this user is 8 seconds. In such
a condition, P = 1
( (1000×8)120 )
4
≈ 118,974,736 = 5.3 × 10−8.
Compared with that of the Passkey Entry of BLE Pairing,
which is P = 1999,999 = 1 × 10−6, our Switchpairing is
much more secure. Moreover, our design can be more secure
when the user extend the association period or preforms the
switch off/on operations for more time.
6.4 Active eavesdropping and guessing attack
A strong attacker may attempt to combine the active
eavesdropping attack and the guessing attack together to
craft a sophisticated attack. In such a scenario, an attacker
is capable of supervising the user, and he may obtain an
estimated time at which the user presses the buttons by
barely observing the user’s operations via his naked eyes.
Therefore, he may guess the actual time based on the esti-
mated time. We argue that this is also not feasible due to
the attacker can only have one try. If the guessing attempt
fails, the two pairing devices will result in the same key
and will not repeat the pairing process anymore. Actually,
when performing the active eavesdropping attack, the at-
tacker is deploying this type of attack subconsciously. Thus,
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Fig. 4: The success rate vs. delay tolerance (two devices)
this sophisticated attack is subject to active eavesdropping
attack and our pairing protocol can defend this without any
changes.
7 EVALUATION
In this Section, we conduct a set of evaluations to show
the feasibility and security of our SwtichPairing protocol.
Notably, our evaluation will cover the following aspects.
We first show the impact of delay tolerance and switch
off/on numbers. Afterward, we measure the overhead of
our SwtichPairing protocol. We then show how does Switch-
Pairing mitigate various attacks during pairing process.
Finally, we also demonstrate that our protocol runs on
multiple devices properly. Please note that fault tolerance
is configured to zero by default unless explicitly stated
otherwise, which will provide a higher security level for our
pairing process. However, in the case of SwitchPairing on
multiple device, we also show the impact of fault tolerance.
7.1 The impact of delay tolerance
Obviously, for two given devices, the security of our
pairing protocol partly depends on their common delay
tolerance. In our experiment, we use two CC2640 chips, and
the delay tolerance should be considered as the same. This
experiment is used to explore the common delay tolerance
of TI’s CC2640 chip. The common delay tolerance is set to
20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120 milliseconds, respectively. We perform
the switch off/on operation 4 times as a test, and for each
common delay tolerance, we carry out 10 tests; hence, the
success rate is defined as the number of successful key
generation (i.e., keys generated on both side are identical)
over 10. Fig. 4 shows the result. It can be observed that when
the delay tolerance is 120 milliseconds, the two devices can
always generate the same key.
7.2 The impact of switch off/on numbers
In addition to the delay tolerance, vendors may also
increase the number of switch off/on operations n to en-
large the keyspace, achieving stronger security protection,
which we have elaborated on in our security analysis. For
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Fig. 5: The success rate vs. the number of switch off/on
operations
instance, performing switch off/on four times to generate
a key should be secure enough for home appliances, but it
may fail to achieve the requirement of critical devices such
as medical equipment. In this experiment, we will explore
the impact of switch off/on numbers. To this end, we set
the delay tolerance as 120 ms and perform switch off/on
operations for 5, 6, 7 times, respectively. For each case, we
carry out 10 tests; hence, the success rate is defined as the
number of successful key generation (i.e., keys generated
on both side are identical) over 10. Fig. 5 shows the results.
We can observe that even when n = 7, we can still get an
acceptable, successful pairing rate. However, according to
equation 19, as n increases, the probability P of executing a
guessing attack successfully will decrease exponentially.
Some failures of the pairing process due to the issues of
the device itself such as reboot failures. This is why the
success rate is lager when n = 6 than that when n = 5.
For the sake of rigor, we also factor in these results. We
argue that these failures will be eliminated if the chips are
better designed. For now, the vendors may want to tweak
their delay tolerance to avoid this type of failure.
7.3 The overhead of our protocol
Recall that the secrets are exchanged directly in some
pairing protocols such as Passkey Entry of BLE. However,
in our protocol, the secrets is hashed from the timestamps.
Therefore, we want to evaluate the overhead of our protocol,
i.e., the overhead caused by the calculation of the secrets.
Two types of hash algorithms are evaluated, including MD5
and SHA256. We run each algorithm 500, 1000, 1500, 2000,
2500 times accordingly and the input of the hash function
is the timestamps. Particularly, we randomly generate 4, 5,
6 timestamps respectively. Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 give the results.
Please note that we are aware of that the MD5 is not secure.
We use MD5 as an example to demonstrate that vendors
can achieve high security by using the SHA256 instead of
using MD5, since with the SHA256 enforced, only little
overhead is involved, as shown in the figures. It can also be
observed that the overhead will not increase rapidly when
we increase the number of preforming the switch on/off.
Regarding this, we can enhance the security of our protocol
by simply increasing the required switch on/off times.
7.4 User Study I: The time intervals between opera-
tions
When a user operates the plug (i.e., switch on/off), we
may want to know the time intervals between two opera-
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Fig. 6: The time intervals between operations
tions. This is a fundamental parameter, which determines
the other parameters related to the security of our protocol.
As analyzed in Section 6, as the interval increases, the
security of our protocol will increase rapidly. However, the
operation speeds vary from one person to another. There-
fore, we need to conduct a user study to set up a benchmark.
Particularly, we are able to recruit 20 human subjects. All the
human subjects are required to switch on and off the plug
5 times. We set the delay tolerance as 120ms and record
the numbers of ticks between every two operations. It can
be observed that the numbers of ticks between every two
operations is around 69 (i.e., 64.6+70.2+67.95+70+705 = 68.55).
Therefore, the time interval is around 69*120/1000 = 8
seconds.
7.5 User Study II: The impact of power sources
This experiment explores the impact of different power
sources. We conduct the experiment as follows. First, we
plug the two peer devices on two different power sources
(two plugs). Then, a volunteer is asked to perform the
pairing process. Specifically, each hand of the volunteer is
supposed to control a specific power source. For example,
the left hand may control the plug, which connects a master
device, while the right hand may control the plug with a
salve device connected. To conduct the pairing process, the
volunteer may need to press the switch “on/off” button
several times. Particularly, we are able to recruit 5 human
subjects as volunteers. Before our experiment, we require
the volunteers to press switch ”on/off” button on each
power plug synchronously every time. We set the delay tol-
erance as 120 ms and the switch “on/off” time as four times.
We run the test 10 times. Table 2 shows the results. It can be
observed that the success rate is relatively low when they
perform the switch off/on operations on different power
sources. This experiment proves that the power source also
has impact on the results. Therefore, for an attacker whose
device is not connected to the same plug as the victim does,
it is extremely challenging for the attacker to deploy attacks
successfully.
TABLE 2: The impact of power sources
User # Total Attempts Succeed Attempts Success Rate
1 10 0 0%
2 10 1 10%
3 10 0 0%
4 10 1 10%
5 10 2 20%
7.6 User Study III: Simulated attacks
Passkey Entry is subject to an eavesdropping attack where
a strong attacker can supervise the user somehow, such as
the attacker stands around the user and peeps the Passkey
on the display of the victim device. Once the attacker sees
the Passkey, he may deploy the MITM attack. However,
our protocol can defend such an attacker innately since the
reaction speed of a human subject is relatively slow when
compares to machines. According to a report from [45], the
median reaction time of a human subject is around 215
ms, which is well above the bar used in our experiments
(120 ms). To explore the feasibility of such an attack, we
developed User Studies via 21 human subjects.
In the first experiment, the 20 human subjects pretend to
be attackers, whose goal are to deploy the attack introduced
above. We offer each human subject (i.e., the “attacker”) a
suite of our testing device: a power source with a develop-
ment board plugged in. The “attacker” can switch off/on
the power source freely by pressing the “on/off” button on
the plug, which will lead the development board to reboot.
The remaining human subject is asked to act like the victim.
Basically, during our experiment, the victim will press the
button 4 times. According to our analysis in Section 6, a user
switching on/off 4 times is secure enough when compared
with the Passkey Entry of BLE. The “attackers” now are
asked to press the “on/off” button as soon as he/her sees
the victim does so. We denote this action as an attacking
attempt. Fig. 7 shows the results, which demonstrates the
relationship between successful attacking attempts (all 4
times) and the number of “attackers”. For example, the first
column indicates that there are 40% attackers (which is 20 ×
40%=8), failing in all 4 attacking attempts, while the second
column indicates that there are 5 attackers successfully
deploying one attacking attempts. Recall that if and only
if all attacking attempts succeed, the same key can then be
generated. Therefore, we conclude that there is no attacker
succeed. However, in order to counter persistent attackers
for higher security level, the number of switching shall be
increased.
7.7 SwitchPairing on multiple devices
From the evaluation above, we know that SwitchPairing
can achieve secure pairing on two devices. In this Section,
we will demonstrate that our SwichPairing also works well
on multiple devices. Specifically, three CC2640R2F are in-
volved, and each development board runs our SwitchPair-
ing protocol. All three development boards are connected
to the same power source, and we require the volunteer
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TABLE 3: The impact of fault tolerance ϕ and delay
tolerance (ms)
Fault tolerance
success rate Delay tolerance
120 140 160
ϕ = 25% 70% 90% 100%
ϕ = 50% 100% 100% 100%
to press switch ”on/off” button 4 times. We set the delay
tolerance as 120 ms, 140 ms, 160 ms, 180ms, 200ms respec-
tively for each device. We run the test for 10 times and
evaluate the success rate under different delay tolerance.
Fig. 10 shows the results. It can be observed that when
the delay tolerance reaches 200ms, the success rate reaches
100%. Although this delay tolerance is close to (actually
below) the median reaction time of a human subject (i.e.,
215 ms), it is still challenging for attackers to deploy the
“peep” attacks, seeing that the success of the attack requires
all attacking attempts are made correctly.
Table 3 shows the impacts of fault tolerance ϕ on different
delay tolerance. It can be observed when the fault tolerance
is increased to 25%, which refers to our protocol allows
1 error to occur (1/4= 25%), the protocol have a good
performance when pair up three devices. However, we also
argue that there is a trade-off when SwitchPairing is used
for pairing up multiple devices. Manufactures may need
to configure the delay tolerance as well as fault tolerance
carefully when they want to use our protocol on multiple
devices. Moreover, seeing that delay is closely related to
chips, manufactures may also enhance the success rate
within a small delay tolerance by using a relatively better-
designed chip. Another nature solution for this issue is the
user may want to make sure that he is not under supervising
by an attacker while preforming the pairing on multiple
devices, to such a degree that the fault tolerance can be
set to a higher value as well, leading to a higher success
rate. This is reasonable since standard Bluetooth pairing
protocols such as passkey entry make such an assumption.
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, 2020 12
8 LIMITATIONS AND COMPARISON
We admit that our SwitchPairing protocol also have some
limitations: unlike some context-based pairing protocols
such as [11], [12] that reviewed in Section 2.1, which do not
interfere users, our pairing protocol requires users’ atten-
tion while conducting the pairing protocol. Regarding this
limitation, we argue that (i) our pairing protocol does not
require expensive auxiliary equipment/peripherals, which
is suitable for the low-priced devices such as smart lamps.
That is, our protocol has its advantages when compared to
these protocols without consulting a user. (ii) This drawback
widely exists in the most of proximity-based device pairing
protocols such as Bluetooth pairing protocol [10]. As a type
of proximity-based device pairing protocols, our protocol
follows the principles strictly, so that our protocol does not
downgrade the user-experience of proximity-based device
pairing protocols. (iii) The context-based pairing protocols
will become defenseless when an attacker is close enough, in
that situation the protocol can not distinguish an attacking
device from the genuine devices. Our protocol requires the
physical access to the victim device, which takes much more
efforts for an attacker. Thus, our protocol is more secure than
previous protocols.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an approach to trade off the
security and economics of IoT pairing protocols, which is
an issue that most of the existing pairing protocols fail
to address. We propose and implement a practical pairing
protocol called SwitchPairing, in which two devices pair up
together without using auxiliary equipment. The Switch-
Pairing protocol was demonstrated via two development
boards from TI. Our implementation shows that our proto-
col can be extended to other chips and other communicating
venues with little effort. Evaluations and user studies are
performed to validate this cost-effective solution. Addition-
ally, our security analysis shows that our protocol is robust
against common attacks.
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